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Criminal trial procedure in eighteenth-century England: the impact of lawyers 
By David Lemmings 
 
John Langbein’s work on the English criminal trial, culminating in The Origins of 
Adversary Criminal Trial, has generally transformed our understanding of how the 
modern Anglo-American ‘lawyerised’ procedure came about. But for a social historian 
like me, who is interested in the rise and rise of the lawyers and other quasi-ministerial 
professionals from the sixteenth century, his work also forms a crucial chapter in the long 
story of professionalization in law and governance, and the effective marginalization of 
lay people.  
 
Langbein’s extensive studies of Old Bailey trials have helped to identify the 
eighteenth century as a watershed in this story. The origins of the lawyerised trial lay in 
the growth of semi-professional policing and official prosecution in Georgian London, 
then subject to unprecedented public concerns about crime. Under Queen Anne and the 
first two Georges the central government took an unprecedented interest in the 
prosecution of notorious crimes. As their business, and their exposure to crime increased 
from the end of the seventeenth century, several of the departments of state – the 
Treasury, the Mint, the Post Office and the Bank of England - appointed an officer who 
took responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, and 
increasingly they tended to fee counsel too. Similarly, the solicitor for the City of London 
was prosecuting felony in the 1730s, and it seems these institutional prosecutions 
progressively influenced private prosecutors, because after mid-century there is evidence 
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from various parts of the country of solicitors and attorneys prosecuting cases for private 
individuals.1 Professional prosecution begot professional defense. Following evidence of 
a trickle of criminal cases prosecuted by counsel from the beginning of the century, 
several historians have drawn attention to the relatively sudden appearance of counsel 
partially representing defendants in felony trials at the Old Bailey and in the Surrey assize 
proceedings from the mid 1730s, despite the longstanding judicial prohibition against 
their appearance, other than to speak on issues of law.2
But how precisely did this happen? Langbein’s astute detective work has now 
revealed that this important shift in courtroom practice followed hard on the heels of a 
series of scandals by which innocent defendants were prosecuted on the initiative of 
unscrupulous thief-takers and ‘Newgate solicitors’ who invented evidence and coached 
witnesses with the aim of profiting from rewards for convictions. Also the practice by 
which London magistrates keen to break up gangs admitted accomplices to give evidence 
against their fellows in return for immunity from prosecution was probably adding to the 
anxiety about the dangers of unsafe convictions on perjured evidence. In these 
circumstances he conjectures that the common law judges who presided at the Old Bailey 
and in the crown courts on the Home circuit must have come to realize that the 
intervention of interested quasi-professionals in the preparation of cases had tipped the 
balance of the criminal trial in favour of the prosecution, to the extent that there was a 
growing danger of juries being persuaded to convict by an accumulation of unsafe or 
insufficient evidence. Their response was to facilitate further professionalization. 




individual trial judges used their discretion to permit barristers to stand in for defendants 
by examining and cross-examining witnesses, therefore ‘evening up’ the balance of 
justice and enabling more rigorous testing of the prosecution evidence.3
However it was taken, such a decision was a momentous one for the future 
development of the criminal trial, and for the representation of lay voices. Certainly it 
was the presence of counsel for the defense in a growing number of cases – especially 
after the 1780s when their numbers expanded considerably – which seems to have been 
ultimately responsible for the increasing application and full development of exclusionary 
rules of evidence which became standard by the nineteenth century.
  
 
4 Although defence 
barristers were not permitted to speak directly on behalf of their clients before 1836, and 
even in 1800 two-thirds of the trials at the Old Bailey had no lawyers, the presence of 
lawyers in a significant minority of cases facilitated the gradual development of the trial 
process into a formally-structured and sequenced dialogue between ‘cases’ for the 
prosecution and the defense, thereby helping to consolidate modern ideas about the 
prosecution’s burdens of production and proof.5 Ultimately the trial’s purpose was 
transformed into providing the defense with the opportunity to test the prosecution’s 
case.6 Already by the 1750s at the Old Bailey the early consequences of this shift were 
becoming clear. In the case of Elizabeth Woodcock, tried in October 1754 for stealing a 
few shillings from a drunken man in an alehouse, Lord Chief Justice Ryder stopped the 
case after the witnesses for the prosecution had been heard, the victim’s evidence having 
been undermined by the counsel for the prisoner.7 Directed verdicts like this suggested 
that the burden of adducing sufficient evidence lay with the prosecution, and allowed the 
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accused to remain silent. The application of the privilege against self-incrimination to 
criminal defendants followed naturally, and was firmly entrenched in the nineteenth 
century. But even in 1790 the leading defense counsel William Garrow was confident 
enough of this principle – and of his powers - to rely upon his own judgment as to when 
his clients had a case to answer. Defending the coachman William Hayward, who was 
accused of stealing a chariot harness from his former employer, his questioning of the 
prosecution’s witnesses inferred that the harness was a legitimate perquisite in lieu of 
unpaid wages, while the employer was mean-spirited and vindictive. He thereupon 
declared ‘I shall call no witnesses in such a case; and I advise the coachman to say 
nothing’, after which the judge directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.8 
 
Leaving aside arguments about the improved prospects for defendants, under 
these conditions it appears that lay voices were progressively controlled and partially 
muted by the presence of the lawyers, both at the committal hearing and the trial. By the 
1820s, when the impact of the lawyers’ work was becoming apparent to contemporaries, 
the defendant was often substantially excluded from the proceedings; witnesses were 
clearly being selected and carefully prepared for what they would prove according to the 
solicitor’s brief; and members of the jury were reduced to interested but passive 
spectators of the trial: they voted, but had no active voice. In other words, the criminal 
trial was well on the way to assuming its modern forms.9 Parliament put the seal on this 
process in 1836 with the Prisoner’s Counsel Act, which established the rights of persons 
accused of criminal offences to be fully represented by counsel, who in cases of felony 
could ‘make full Answer and Defence’.10 
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It is possible to gain a sense of the transformation in the proceedings which 
accompanied professionalization by comparing the increasingly formal conduct of early 
nineteenth-century trials with those of a century earlier. Before 1700 the absence of 
lawyers was regarded as fundamental because felony trials were organized around the 
principle that judges and jurors had to make their discretionary decisions about verdict 
and (especially) sentence on the basis of an unmediated exchange between the defendant 
and the prosecutors. As Langbein has shown very clearly, pre-trial and trial were 
structured to force the accused to speak and exculpate himself.11 Above all, judge and 
jury needed to decide whether the gravity of the offence and the circumstances and 
character of the accused deserved death or some lesser sanction, such as transportation or 
imprisonment. That was usually the main purpose of the trial. Essentially, at a time when 
the lack of investigative policing meant that most alleged offenders were caught red-
handed, little incriminating evidence was excluded, and there was no substantive 
presumption of innocence, the trial was an opportunity for the accused to respond to the 
victim’s accusation, and for judge and jury to assess his or her explanation for each fact 
alleged, before making their determinations. So prisoners were required to conduct their 
own defenses - as cross-examiner, witness and advocate - with the result that the 
proceedings normally amounted to a ‘rambling altercation’ between the prosecution 
witnesses, the defendant, and the judge.12
Admittedly, a spirited defense was relatively unusual: when confronted with the 




accomplices, or found with stolen goods, defendants most frequently had little to say for 
themselves. But that was probably because they were guilty, at least before the scales 
were tipped against defendants by professional prosecutors. Indeed, in the context of so 
many trials where the defendant had been caught virtually red-handed, the unmediated 
victim versus prisoner contests seemed fair to many contemporaries.13 Widespread public 
doubts only clearly appeared when accumulated experience of the arts and partizanship of 
prosecution lawyers began to be suspected of creating circumstantial cases that would 
have failed without their efforts.14 It is important to understand that decision-making on 
the basis of observing direct altercations between the protagonists genuinely represented 
the historic participatory tradition of the common law criminal trial. Justifying the 
common law rule against defense counsel in his Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 
published in 1721, William Hawkins insisted: 
 
 It requires no manner of Skill to make a plain and Honest 
 Defence, which in cases of this Kind [i.e. in serious criminal cases] 
 is always the best; the Simplicity and Innocence, artless and  
 ingenuous Behaviour of one whose Conscience acquits him, 
 having something in it more moving and convincing than the 
 highest Eloquence of Persons speaking in a Cause not their 
 own. … Whereas on the other Side, the very Speech, Gesture 
and Countenance, and Manner of Defence of those who are 
Guilty, when they speak for themselves, may often help 
to disclose the Truth, which probably would not so well be 
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discovered from the artificial Defence of others speaking for 
them.15 
 
Hawkins’s apparent faith in the unvarnished transparency of guilt or innocence has 
mostly been ridiculed by nineteenth and twentieth-century commentators, but without 
denying the substantive achievements of justice wrought by counsel in criminal practice, 
such views are somewhat anachronistic.16 His position clearly had its roots in the origins 
of the trial by jury as a process for representatives of the community to discover their 
own knowledge about the crime and the protagonists.17 Although by the eighteenth 
century the jury was hardly expected to have eye-witness evidence of the crime itself, the 
encouragement of an unstructured altercation and relatively unfettered jury access to all 
kinds of incriminating evidence represented contemporary faith in the jurors’ ability to 
make decisions about the protagonists’ characters and community standing on the basis 
of their immediate impressions and previous (usually extensive) experience of sitting in 
judgement on similar cases. By contrast with their modern counterparts, who sit on juries 
for one case and consider prosecution and defense ‘cases’ passively and inscrutably 
before rendering their verdicts, these jurors were effectively expert witnesses, as well as 
lay judges, for they even conveyed their impressions to the court before the case was 
closed, through extensive informal discussion with the judges.18
Given its inquisitorial and subjective character, this kind of interactive vernacular 
fact-finding by the jurors was still akin to the ‘unofficial knowledge’ central to the 




crime for themselves.19 Certainly there were still traces of the more active and 
participatory roles of medieval juries in the early eighteenth century. For example, jurors 
would often interject, especially when witnesses were telling their stories.20 Examination 
of just one Old Bailey session can produce several instances. In  R. v. Richard Marshall 
et al, for burglary and receiving stolen goods, tried in October 1732, the principal witness 
was John Griffin, alias ‘King John’, who had turned king’s evidence in return for 
immunity from prosecution. He related how on the night of 27 September he and 
Marshall had twice burgled the house of Henry Carey in Cold Bath Fields, but after being 
disturbed on the second occasion by a woman calling out ‘Who’s there’, Marshall went 
back again by himself to get more booty. One of the jurors was obviously unconvinced, 
because he asked how the defendant had the nerve to go back a third time, and Griffin 
thereupon explained that they had left some of the household goods outside the premises, 
so there was little danger of discovery.21 And at the same sessions, in the trial of Thomas 
Headly and Henry Chapman for a highway robbery on George Young, an apothecary, a 
juror intervened in the trial with a pointed question and challenge to the evidence of a 
witness who had given the prosecutor a character for honesty and good standing, 
confidently relating a personal exchange with Young which suggested that he  - and the 
witness - were not trustworthy at all. The judge clearly thought this was a legitimate 
contribution to the proceedings, for he did not intervene or put the juror on his oath (as 
his successors did later in the century); and no doubt such an injection of doubt from 
within their own number assisted in the jury’s eventual decision to acquit the prisoners.22 
It is true that judges were normally able to control jury prejudices and apparently 
wayward decisions by their positive instructions, but there are even a few examples of 
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late-seventeenth century juries arguing with the bench over issues of fact and law, and 
not only in cases which were influenced by political partizanship.23
So, like the defendants themselves, the jurors were remarkably active participants 
in criminal trials before the proceedings were colonised by the lawyers. Indeed 
contemporary sessions charges tended to celebrate the constitutional role of juries, even 
describing them as ‘the Representatives of the People of England’.
 
 
24 But although its 
formal decision-making power was not diminished, and its autonomy increased 
somewhat, the jury was largely silenced as an active voice by the professionalization of 
the criminal trial, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century.25 It was probably no 
coincidence that in 1738, just as barristers were being allowed to intervene in criminal 
trials and began to control the jury’s access to the evidence and the defendant, a ruling in 
a civil suit effectively removed the civil jury’s theoretical right to decide a case according 
to their personal knowledge, thereby subjecting them to formal judicial control and an 
order for a new trial in case of private knowledge being disclosed as an influence on the 
verdict.26 Indeed, eighteenth-century judges began the process that Simpson has 
described as the ‘progressive dethronement of the jury’ by formulating new rules of law 
which restricted the scope of jury decision-making.27  Moreover, there were legislative 
attempts to ensure that criminal trial juries were socially exclusive, and some civil juries 
were carefully selected for their elite status.28 Certainly Lord Mansfield famously relied 
on special juries of merchants to advise and adjudicate commercial disputes. It is less 
well known that he also used special juries of ‘gentlemen of fortune’ in some other cases, 
especially prosecutions for criminal conversation, where jurors were expected to 
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understand and enforce gentlemanly notions of honour.29  In fact these events appear to 
have been symptomatic of a more general process, by which virtually all vernacular 
forms and expressions of knowledge were progressively devalued. As Malcolm Gaskill 
has suggested, in the eighteenth century progressive social differentiation meant that 
‘opinion generated by custom, memory, rumour and local knowledge, and the popular 
modes of demonstrating that opinion, no longer carried as much weight’, and he has 
shown that this was clearly reflected in several criminal law proceedings. Rational rules 
about the admissibility of evidence were accompanied by social prejudices about its 
origins and modes of expression. In cases of murder even ‘quasi-professional’ medical 
testimony was preferred to the vernacular observations and beliefs of lay people, and 
hearsay – the currency of community values – was in the process of being excluded.30
Here was a clash between a culture of common sense typical of everyday life 
among ordinary people, as opposed to more scientific Enlightenment ideas about degrees 
of probability which attach to various forms of testimony, ideas associated with the 
discourse of the educated middle classes.
 
 
31 Their effects on the jury have been closely 
observed. As Barbara Shapiro has shown, empirical standards of proof associated with 
John Locke and other philosophical writers were current among legal thinkers at the end 
of the seventeenth century, and after 1750 phrases like ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and  
‘to a moral certainty’ began to be used by judges in their instructions to jurors about the 
standards of proof required for conviction. Certainly by the 1820s, when Thomas 
Starkie’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence was published and widely 
assimilated, jurors were expected to apply rational tests of probability, and to avoid 
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deciding on ‘light, trivial and fanciful suppositions, and remote conjectures’.32 Moreover, 
the criminal trial court was well on the way to its modern ‘bifurcation’ into separate 
spheres for lawyers and jury, with the flow of information strictly regulated by the  
professionals.33 
 
By the later eighteenth century, then, as John Langbein’s splendid book shows so 
clearly, profound shifts in the administration of the criminal law were underway. I would 
argue that taken with parallel changes in law enforcement and punishment – centering on 
policing and the penitentiary, they seem to betoken new attitudes and fresh ambitions for 
positive governance. It was not just that correcting plebeian culture was regarded as the 
primary mission of the criminal justice ‘system’, as it was being elaborated in new penal 
and policing ‘solutions’ to the growing crime ‘problem’. In addition lay people were 
being marginalized from the administration of justice in favour of professionals and 
officials, despite its origins and continued ideological associations with the participatory 
traditions of the common law tradition. This was hardly a coincidence. Certainly some of 
these shifts were the practical consequences of genuine concerns about what was 
perceived as a rising tide of criminality, especially in the major urban centres, and in 
London above all. Indeed in the early years of the century many anti-crime measures 
were adopted in a piecemeal, ad hoc, fashion that can hardly be characterized as any 
coherent ‘policy’. But from their beginnings these changes were also connected with the 
tendency for polite opinion to coalesce around criticism of some principal features of 
popular culture, such as casual physicality and the legitimacy of violence in interpersonal 
relations, and social ordering by folklore, intuitive knowledge and gossip.  
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Moreover, and to return to the subject of John’s book, the demise of the ‘accused 
speaks’ trial symbolized a profound shift in the institutional forms of government. The 
old form of lawyer-free trial represented an exchange between citizen prosecutors and 
citizen defendants, ‘representative’ partners with jurors, in the sense that ordinary people 
were expected to participate fully in the trial process and argue their cases for themselves 
as free subjects. In this sense, besides its fact-finding role, in a broader way the criminal 
trial was a point of contact and exchange between central government and the common 
people at a time when the formal institutions of government were hardly democratic. As 
Lord Hardwicke said (in 1747), ‘I look upon the administration of justice, as the principal 
and essential part of all government. The people know and judge of it by little else’.34 
This was a comment derived from the world of Coke and Hale, where courts, rather than 
parliaments, were primary institutions of representative governance.35
                                                          
1 J.H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford, 2003), esp. 113-27. 
 But just as 
eighteenth-century parliaments were becoming law-making machines, and representing 
themselves as the repositories of the ‘will of the people’, lawyers were taking over the 
eighteenth-century criminal trial. Henceforward Everyman and Everywoman tended to 
experience law and government as something done in their names, rather than with their 
direct participation. 
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